income transfers encourage workers to drop out of the labor force by providing them with the prospect of a generous income. Moreover, once enrolled in disability-benefit program s, beneficiaries are reluctant to look for work because benefits are threatened if an attem pt to return to work proves unsuccessful after the trial period provided by the law (Treitel 1979 )-A ttem pts to reduce disability benefits, then, have been predicated on the assum ption that individuals choose to stop, work and that the incentive to do so should be lessened. This article asks whether the evidence underlying this point of view is sufficient to justify the policy o f retrenchment.
Several trends in American society fuel the controversy about the relation o f chronic disease to work. Smaller proportions o f adults of prime working ages are currently employed than in the past (Parnes 1981 ; U .S . Bureau o f the Census 1984, 390) . Ill health, particularly impairment, substantially reduces labor-force participation rates (Chirikos and Nestel 1981) . A larger proportion o f the adult population claims to have a health condition lim iting activities than a decade ago (Colvez and Blanchet 1981) . The number of beneficiaries of SSDI and Sup plemental Security Income (SSI) grew dramatically in the 1970s, as did the size o f the benefits (the number of SSDI recipients has since declined) (U .S. Department o f Health and Human Services. Social Security Adm inistration 1986). But what to make o f these trends? Perhaps the health o f Americans has worsened objectively and this leads to lower levels o f labor-force participation and to increases in the number o f persons receiving benefits from the SSDI and SSI programs. Alternatively, the taste for work has lessened and the claim of poorer health status merely legitim ates early withdrawal from the labor market.
The belief that individuals choose to withdraw from work has been buttressed by decades o f research in several academic disciplines. The sociological version relies on the notion o f the sick role (Parsons 1951 (Parsons , 1975 Twaddle 1969; Mechanic 1978; Freidson 1970; Reisine 1981) , in which individuals seek to gain sanction to withdraw from activities both by acting sick and being told by a physician that they are sick. Parsons (1975) 
writes:
These considerations [i.e ., his earlier work] suggested that on the part o f the sick person himself, there m ight be, more generally than had been believed, an element o f " motivatedness" not merely in the etiology of the pathological condition, but also in the main tenance of it.
Psychologists call their version of the choice model, "labeling theory." Here the act of telling individuals they have illnesses makes them act as if this were so, reducing their activities far more than an objective assessment of actual capacities would indicate is justified (Scheff 1966; Haynes et al. 1978; Cockerham 1979; Thoits 1985) .
Economists, however, have gone much farther than researchers from other disciplines in developing and testing " choice" models of the relation of chronic illness to work. In the economic version, individuals choose between labor and leisure by assessing the incomes they would receive in and out o f the labor force, the value they place on work, and the difficulties they face in working with a chronic condition. According to the model, individuals are more likely to stop working if the incomes they expect while out of the labor force are high relative to those obtained while working. To make this assessment, they need to estimate their incomes in the two situations. The proportion that results from dividing income if not working by income if working (sometimes called the replacement rate) provides a simple way of calibrating the choices individuals and families face after onset of chronic disease. Moreover, if replacement rates correlate with withdrawal from work, then by manipulating replacement rates society can reduce incentives to leave work before required by physical incapacitation. For if nonworking incomes are high relative to working ones, then SSDI and SSI benefits can be reduced, thus lowering expected income in the nonwork alternative.
The earliest studies of the effect of replacement rate on work blamed much of the decline in male labor-force participation rates on the increases in the size o f SSDI benefits which occurred in the 1960s and 1970s (Pechman, Aaron, and Taussig 1978; Feldstein 1974) . In more recent studies, the effect of the replacement rate on labor-force participation varies from great (Chirikos and Nestel 1984; Parsons 1980) to slight (Haveman and Wolfe 1984) and seems dependent on the definition of health and replacement rate used, and on the population under study (Wolfe 1984; Anderson and Burkhauser 1985) .
The terms " sick role," " labeling theory," " replacement rate," and "choice" create an image of those with chronic conditions as malingerers. This image of malingering must compete, however, with the image of need which lies at the heart of programs like SSDI. But what constitutes " need'7 Few impairments-even quadriplegia-preclude employment. This being so, very little absolute need exists. How then to adjudicate the claim that an individual can no longer work? The regulations governing SSD I allow age, education, and work ex perience to be considered in deciding the merit of applications for benefits. Most applications for SSDI pose no problems of interpretation, clearly meeting or m issing minim al medical criteria. However, many lie in the gray zone. The social policy debate concerns these cases and revolves around the question o f whether, in the absence of definitive medical criteria (''absolute need'*), individuals choose disability rather than work.
The com peting images of choice and need are rarely joined in disability research. The economists' choice models include limited measures of health status, in effect letting health become a constraint in a general model o f labor-market behavior (Wolfe 1984) . In contrast, other researchers, emphasizing how the structures of an individual's life affect work status, include excruciating detail on the number and kind of medical conditions and on the physical impairments which result, but no information about expected income (Haber 1971) .
The purpose o f this article is to join the research traditions by estimating models o f work outcome which include variables central to the need and choice models. In so doing, I hypothesize that choice models will be found wanting because they postulate a set of behaviors which are risky. Individuals may not estimate their future incomes accurately when they face the decision to leave work, because disability benefits constitute an important part of their expected income and the process o f filing for benefits is long and, to judge from the record, the outcome quixotic. Reasonable people would be cautious in deciding to leave work now on the expectation that they will receive adequate income later. Furthermore, choice models emphasize the negative incentives o f high replacement rates to the exclusion of the strong countervailing force o f the work ethic. That replacement rates are easily measured, while commitment to work is not, does not excuse this oversight.
The specific goals o f this article are:
1. To estimate the effect of the replacement rate on the probability o f labor-force participation when discrete measures of health, function, characteristics o f work, and attitudes about work are included; 2. To estimate the relative risk associated with each health, social, and economic predictor o f labor-force participation in the context o f models which include choice and need variables and; 3 . To replicate previous research by the author (Yelin, N evitt, and Epstein 1980) concerning the effect o f the social structure of work on labor-force participation rates.
These goals will be accomplished through analysis of the 1978 Social Security Survey o f Disabled and Non-Disabled Adults (SDA).
Methods

D a t a R e q u i r e m e n t s f o r M o d e l s o f D i s a b i l i t y
The basic strategy o f the analysis to follow is to estimate the effect of the risk factors for work loss commonly noted in the literature on rates of labor-force participation. Since labor-force participation is a dichotomous outcome, I use logistic regression for these estimations.
The earliest studies of work loss after onset of illness included only medical factors. However, despite a strong desire on the part of the medical community to restrict disability to clinical criteria (American Medical Association, Committee on Medical Rating of Physical Im pairment 1958; Stone 1984), medical conditions alone play a relatively minor role in the epidemiology o f work loss. Instead, conditions become important only as they cause physical impairments and only as the impairments interact with the physical requirements of jobs (Haber 1971; Luft 1978) and the social situation of the individual (Allan 1976; Nagi 1976) to cause the social phenomenon called disability. I have argued that, in addition to the characteristics of the individual, the characteristics of work-including the flexibility o f work rulesaffect rates of work loss (Yelin, N evitt, and Epstein 1980) . Finally, the state of the economy at large affects labor-force participation rates among persons with chronic diseases insofar as employers are less likely to hire such persons when they can find all the able-bodied workers they need (Levitan and T aggart, 1977; Berkowitz, Johnson, and Murphy 1976) . The risk factors for work loss, thus, are staggering in number and kind, ranging from subclinical-indeed microscopicmeasures of disease to such features of the macroeconomy as the unemployment rate. N o data set encompasses the detail required for a rigorous test o f each theory of disabilty. The SD A, however, comes closest, including all but the macroeconomic factors.
D a t a S o u r c e s
The SD A was administered in 1978 to 9,859 respondents of working ages, 18 to 64 (Bye and Schechter 1982) . The SDA respondents derived from two distinct sam pling frames. The first was a subset of 5,652 respondents to the 1976 Health Interview Survey (HIS). The HIS respondents were drawn disproportionately from among persons with activity lim itations, and represent the noninstitutionalized pop ulation in the community at large at risk for work loss. The second consisted o f 4 ,2 0 7 individuals who had applied for SSDI benefits at some point, of whom approximately one-tenth had had their applications denied. This frame represents the population who have withdrawn from work after onset o f chronic disease or impairment. Survey re spondents were asked to recount their work situations for the year in which activity lim itations began (if any were), for 1977, and for the study year. Respondents reported all conditions for which they had received a diagnosis from a physician, and all symptoms they experienced whether or not these sym ptoms could be connected to a specific diagnosis. They also reported their attitudes about work, attitudes which reflect the strength o f their orientation to work or, more om inously, their alienation from work. Finally, they reported individual and family incomes by source, knowledge of the disability benefit programs to which they could apply (some obviously already had done so), and standard dem ographic characteristics.
The SD A , like most general social surveys, includes few measures of what I call the social characteristics o f work places-the extent of the individual's autonomy within work. Because of this, I have added such characteristics to the data file by using the "Jo b Characteristics Scoring System " developed by Karasek, Schwartz, and Pieper (1982) . They developed their job scoring system from several waves of the Quality o f Employment Survey (Quinn and Staines 1977) , a national survey of a random, stratified sample of work places, by cross-tabulating working conditions with occupations and industries. The job scores thus created can be added to other surveys by matching occupations and industries, a task which I have done. The job scores include measures o f decision latitude, job security, psychological demands, the physical demands of the job, co-worker and supervisor support, and exposures to hazardous conditions. If respondents to a survey such as the SDA are asked to characterize their working conditions themselves, they m ight report their conditions erroneously to legitimate their withdrawal from work. Because the job scores were calculated on a separate sample, such subjectivity is precluded. On the other hand, since the respondents to the SD A may not have experienced the working conditions attributed to them, the effect o f these variables on labor-force participation may be attenuated.
D a t a P a r t i t i o n s
The analysis in this article is lim ited to those individuals with a history of labor-force participation {n = 5,887), and, thus, excludes individuals who have never worked, whether for health or other reasons. The sam pling frames o f the SD A were designed with different analyses in mind. In combination, the H IS and Social Security Disability Insurance applicant frames include sufficient numbers o f persons who have left work to ensure that the absence o f an effect of replacement rate on work status is not due to poor statistical power. Alone, the HIS frame allows estimation of the contribution o f health to laborforce participation among persons at risk for work loss in the community at large (Bye and Schechter 1982) . I partitioned the SD A further to model the determinants o f work loss in select subpopulations. These include individuals considered at greater risk for work loss because they have at least one chronic condition, experience activity limitations, or are 55 years o f age or older. I also examine separately the risk factors among men and among those men without a working spouse, since rates of male labor-force participation declined precipitously in the 1970s and several analysts attribute this decline to the expansion o f disabilty benefits (Parsons 1980; Fames 1981) . Finally, I created a partition o f those with extremely high or low replacement rates on the assumption that these individuals would be the most highly affected in their labor-force behavior by the replacement rate.
V a r i a b l e s i n t h e A n a l y s i s
The dependent variable in the analysis to follow is coded 1 if the respondent reported working, being on leave or layoff, or looking for work in the week prior to interview, zero otherwise. The major groups of independent variables include diagnoses, symptoms, overall health status, functional capacity, demographic characteristics, attitudes about work, structure o f work, and replacement potential. Appendix table 1 lists the specific independent variables in the analysis, and the scaling o f each such variable.
D e f i n i t i o n a n d C a l c u l a t i o n o f R e p l a c e m e n t P o t e n t i a l
The purpose o f this set o f variables is to determine if individuals who can expect high incomes when not working relative to their incomes when working are more likely to cease employment. The studies in the literature define these variables in different ways. Parsons (1980) calculates a replacement rate from the ratio of expected individual SSDI benefits to individual wages. Haveman and Wolfe (1984) use total expected disability transfers, including those accming to dependents, in calculating the expected nonwork income instead of lim iting this figure to individual SSD I benefits. They then include a measure of income in the equation testing the effects of replacement rate on work status. In this study, I follow Parsons in using the concept of a replacement rate, that is, income when not working divided by income when working, and I define replacement rate in several ways to increase the chance that the results are insensitive to the definition of replacement rate. The first set o f replacement rates are calculated from family incomes when the survey respondent does and does not work. There is good reason to use family incomes. Individuals make their decisions about work in concert with other family members who may already work, who may choose to enter the labor force, or who may leave it to help care for persons with chronic conditions. However, I also test models in which the replacement rate is based solely on individual income-total disability transfers if not working and earnings if working.
One can calculate replacement rates by using estimates of both the numerator and denominator. I include such rates below. However, if one is working, earnings need not be estimated since that figure is available from the respondent. Likewise, if an individual is not working, his or her report o f transfer income is available. Thus, it is possible to use actual transfer income in the numerator if a respondent is not working and actual earnings in the denominator if the respondent is working while using estimates for the other term of the replacement rate. I have calculated a set of replacement rates in which one term derives from the report of income and the other is estimated.
Previous studies of the effect o f replacement rate on work assume that individuals can estimate accurately their future incomes. To do this, they m ust know the programs from which they can draw benefits should they choose to withdraw from work. The SDA asked respondents to report the potential sources o f disability income o f which they were aware. I include the report o f the number o f such potential sources in some of the labor-force regressions reported below on the assumption that individuals who are unaware o f any sources o f disability income would be less likely to achieve the income estimated for them in the replacement rate.
The replacement rates that derive from family incomes were calculated by dividing the sample into those currently working and those out of the labor force. For each o f these two groups I then used ordinary least squares regression to estimate the effect o f diagnoses, symptoms, function, and work characteristics for the job held prior to the onset of illness (if any) on family income. From the resulting equations, one can calculate how much family income would be for a respondent with a given matrix of characteristics if not working and if working. By dividing these figures, one arrives at a replacement rate for each respondent. The individual income replacement rates were calculated in an analogous fashion, but I used total transfer income to estimate the numerator and earnings to estimate the denominator. A variable, measuring the residual amount o f family income, was included in the regressions, which tested the effect of individual income replacement rates on work status. As above, actual family or individual income can be substituted for estimates in the numerator or denominator to calculate replacement rates.
Many authors follow Heckm an's lead (1979) in correcting estimates of expected income for the selectivity bias which arises when one ascribes working income to nonworkers on the basis of workers' char acteristics, and vice versa. In the present case, however, the estimation techniques used understate the income o f nonworkers and overstate the income of workers. This, in turn, biases the effect of replacement rate on work upwards and provides for a more conservative test of its impact. Therefore, the selectivity correction is not used.
D a t a A n a l y s i s
I assess the impact o f replacement rate on labor-force participation by estimating logistic regressions in which the dependent variable is work status and the independent variables include diagnoses, symptoms, functional capacity, demographics, and work characteristics. The analysis is done separately for the combined sam pling frame and the HIS sampling frame alone, for each of the seven data partitions, and for replacement rates based on family and individual income. Again, replacement rates based on estimates of income for both terms and in which one term is estimated and the other derives from actual transfer income or earnings are used. H alf of the regressions include the variable measuring extent of knowledge of disability benefit programs. In all, there are 84 separate tests o f the effect of replacement rate on labor-force behavior.
I use the results o f two o f the logistic regressions to calculate covariates-adjusted relative risk ratios for the independent variables in the analysis. Both regressions include only individuals in the HIS sampling frame. Accordingly, they allow inferences to be drawn about the community at large. In each case, I included the replacement rate calculated totally from estimates of income. The first of these two examples includes all individuals with a history of labor-force partic ipation, regardless o f whether they experience activity limitation. The second includes only those individuals with limitation. The risk ratios calculated from this latter model indicate the impact of each independent variable on work status in a population at higher risk for work loss, those from the former in one much healthier.
As part o f the foregoing analysis, I will replicate research I did earlier (Yelin, N evitt, and Epstein 1980) on the impact of the social characteristics of work on labor-force participation. The earlier research was lim ited to one disease-arthritis-and the results may have been biased by respondent self-report of working conditions. In the present study, all chronic conditions are included and, as noted above, re spondents did not report their own social characteristics of work.
Results
The crisis in Social Security D isability Insurance is part o f the larger phenomenon o f the declining rates of labor-force participation of older adults, and the growth in the number claim ing to be limited in activities due to a chronic condition. Tables 1 and 2 record how far these phenomena had progressed by the study year o f 1978; the tables indicate rates o f labor-force participation and health-related withdrawal from work o f men and women, by race and age, among respondents from the H IS sam pling frame. Most men continue to work until about age fifty, after which rates of labor-force participation drop precipitously. Only half o f white and a quarter o f nonwhite men ages 56 to 64 reported that they still worked or were looking for work (table 1) . O f the half o f white men in this age group who were out o f the labor force, 43 percent claimed that they were retired for health reasons; two-thirds o f nonwhites claimed that health caused them to stop working. (The estimates for nonwhites may be biased by small numbers, but the trend is similar to that among whites.)
Health, apparently, has a much smaller effect on the work patterns o f women (table 2). About one-third and one-fifth o f white women aged 46 to 55 and 56 to 64, respectively, worked. Only a small fraction claimed that health was to blame for this. The pattern was similar among nonwhite women: 15 and 28 percent o f those aged 46 to 55 and 56 to 64 who were not working attributed their work status to a health problem. Although the impact o f health on work status o f women seems sm all, especially when compared to the im paa among men, the absolute impact is profound. For example, of the 60 percent o f women who were not in the labor force, only 6 percent claimed that this was due to poor health. However, this 6 percent translates to about 2 .6 million women in the nation as a whole at the time o f the survey. Am ong men, approximately 6 .4 million claimed to be out o f the labor force because o f their health (U.S.
Bureau o f the Census 1984).
Are replacement rates the culprit behind the declining rates of labor-force participation? Tables 3 and 4 , in which replacement rates are based on family incomes, indicate that they are not. The sample analyzed in table 3 includes disproportionate numbers o f current be neficiaries o f disability benefits. Even so, the replacement rate was not associated with withdrawal from work in any cell. This was as true for putatively high-risk groups-the chronically ill, those limited by chronic disease in their activities, those approaching the normal age o f retirement-as it was for men who were their ftunilies' sole support and, thus, could not expect much in the way o f intrafamily .5 po !-2v c ? * .e a * transfers to compensate for lost income. Even extreme replacement rates do not appear to suppress the will to work. The data in table 4, which derive from the HIS sample alone, more nearly reflect the population at risk for work loss in the community at large than the combined sample. Still, the patterns observed are similar to those o f the combined sam pling frame with one exception: one definition o f replacement rate was negatively associated with laborforce participation among men. This effect did not persist when a variable measuring the level of awareness of potential sources of re placement income was added to the equation, suggesting that as individuals obtain knowledge about potential sources of transfer income they begin to understand how difficult it is to collect benefits and, hence, they do not leave work in response to the replacement rate.
Individuals probably make decisions to leave work in consultation with other members o f their families. Even though the family may be the correct unit of analysis for labor-participation decisions, intrafamily transfers may m ask an effect o f replacement rate on work. Table 5 , therefore, records data on the effect o f individual income replacement rate-that is, transfer income divided by earnings-on the work status of the individual. The results presented in the table indicate that higher individual income replacement rates do not bring about a withdrawal from work, even among men without a working spouse.
Several analysts lim it their analysis to the effect of Social Security Disability Insurance alone on work (Boskin and Hurd 1978; Parsons 1980) . In an attem pt to replicate their findings, I analyzed the effect of replacement rate defined solely as Social Security income divided by individual earnings among men without a working spouse who had sufficient duration o f employment to qualify for SSDI and who were knowledgeable about this program and no others. In no instance was replacement rate negatively associated with labor-force participation (results not in table 5).
Why are the results in tables 3 through 5 at odds with much of the literature? To answer this question, I replicated the models tested in previous studies in which characteristics of work are less discretely specified. These models include long-term occupation, physical job requirements, and tenure (Chirikos and Nestel 1984; Haveman, Wolfe, and W arlick 1982) . They do not include measures of autonomy, demands, discretion, supervisory status, work attitudes, or industry. I estim ated a work-status regression in which replacement rate was 
•^| j based on individual income and which excluded these work charac teristics, finding that replacement rate was negatively associated with work status (results not in table) . This suggests that failure to characterize work in its many dimensions results in the spurious conclusion that high replacement rates entice individuals from work.
So far, I have shown that high replacement rates and labeling do not induce a withdrawal from the labor market. Tables 6 and 7 reflect what does affect work status among all persons in the HIS sam pling frame and those with activity lim itations, respectively. The tables record the results o f the logistic regressions o f labor-force participation on the risk factors for work loss. They include the risk ratios for the variables that significantly affect labor-force behavior (3rd column). They also indicate how much each major group o f variables can affect labor-force participation if the individual variables within the group are given m inim um or m axim um values and all other variables in the analysis are given mean values (4th column). These potential shifts are fictional insofar as alm ost no one has eight diagnoses simultaneously or universally good or bad working conditions. However, they do indicate the relative im pact o f the group of variables on labor-force participation rates.
In the community at large, the nature o f work and the individual's functional capacity are the strongest determinants o f labor-force par ticipation; the presence o f physician-provided diagnoses, attitudes about work, and replacement potential the weakest (table 6). Among persons with lim itations, functional capacity is constrained to have a small effect because persons with good function were eliminated from the analysis. Here, the nature o f work and demographic characteristics have the m ost profound im pacts (table 7). In the community at large and among those with lim itation o f activity, a shift from good to bad working conditions alters the probability o f working from unity to zero.
W hat characteristics o f work account for this effect.^ Work has many dimensions, including physical tasks, social characteristicssuch as autonomy, flexibility, and prestige-and income. In the com munity at large (table 6), the brute force component of the job-the physical tasks-alone do not affect the probability o f working. They do so only as they interact with the physical limitations the individual experiences. Thus, for example, an individual will be more likely to stop working only if a job requires gripping and he or she is limited in the ability to do so. Discretion over the activities and pace of the job, the level o f psychological demand upon the individual at work, and interactions between these two variables all profoundly alter the probability o f working. All else being equal, individuals with high levels o f discretion are almost twice as likely to be working (the risk ratio is 1.93) as those with low levels. Similarly, individuals who work in psychologically dem anding jobs are only 90 percent as likely to retain employment as those in less stressful ones. The combination o f low discretion and high demands reduces the probability o f working by about a half. Finally, being a member o f a labor union protects one from loss o f work: all else being equal, union members are 30 percent more likely to be working than nonmembers. The impact o f discretion and demands is even more profound among persons with lim itations o f activity (table 7) . Individuals in jobs with high levels o f discretion are more than 20 times as likely to be working, despite their lim itations, as those with less autonomy. Those who face high demands and have little discretion to deal with them are only 8 percent as likely to continue working after onset of limitation. Among persons with lim itation o f activity, the physical structure of work does not affect rates o f labor-force participation.
Discussion
When social scientists use the term choice to discuss withdrawal from work in the face o f chronic disease, they give a nice name to behavior which as easily may be called malingering. When they argue that social policy encourages the exercise o f that choice to exchange labor for leisure, the response in W ashington is to the image o f malingering, not choice. The response is to try to get the malingerers off the disability rolls or, at least, to reduce the size o f their benefits. The impact o f these changes in policy, however, falls on the unambiguously ill as well as on those deemed to be equilibrating labor and leisure at the margin. D isability benefits may be lowered to discourage the person with unobservable symptoms o f lower back pain from withdrawing from work, but this lowers the disability income o f the quadriplegic victim o f an auto accident as well. Likewise, if the intent is to remove the undeserving from the rolls, all beneficiaries suffer. Haveman, W olfe, and W arlick (1982) write: "In analyzing the economic hardship that would be imposed if particular subgroups were removed from the rolls . . . [we found that] all groups would suffer substantial economic hardship, with a reduction in family income of 33 to 45 percent/'
Since changes in the level of disability benefits and in the number of awards will hurt thousands-perhaps hundreds o f thousands-of individuals who all would agree are deserving of benefits, before such changes become law there should be no doubt that public policy encourages withdrawal from the labor market. The data presented in this article should raise, not lower, the level of doubt. In all but one trial, higher replacement rates did not correlate with withdrawal from work. And for the one example to the contrary, the addition of a variable measuring the extent of knowledge of transfer programs nullified the effect. This one counterexample suggests that as individuals become aware o f their options, they are less likely to respond to the economic incentive o f replacement rates. Knowledge turns a bird in the hand into one in the bush.
The findings reported here differ from many of the studies in the disability literature, but they are consistent with predictions of what might be found if the types of data available to this study had been analyzed by other researchers. Wolfe (1984) notes that previous studies have included diagnoses, or sim ple measures of limitation and health status, but not both. She calls for analyses which include more complex measurements o f the function o f the individual and for the ways that the requirements o f the job interact with the physical impairments the individual experiences. Likewise, I had previously reported that autonomy on the job correlated with work outcomes in a study of one disease entity (Yelin, N evitt, and Epstein 1980) . This study of persons with all chronic diseases included measures of these phenomena and, thus, better characterized the nature of work than the studies showing that replacement rates induce a withdrawal from work. In turn, the nature o f work closely correlates with replacement rate and, no doubt, accounts for much of its effect on work outcomes.
In this article, I have focused on choice models of labor-force participation and, thus, have not dwelled on the implications for disability policy o f the variables which do affect work outcomes. Obviously, reducing the prevalence o f chronic disease and the activity limitation which results from it would reduce the prevalence of work loss. Ju s t as obviously, this requires medical progress which one can s predict confidently will occur slowly, too slowly to alter the dimensions of the short-term problem. Instead of focusing on the nature of illness, public policy would do well to emphasize the world o f the work place. Altering the characteristics of jobs can reduce the probability of work loss dramatically, even among those with activity limitations. This can be done by modifying the fit between the individual and the job, both in the interaction between the physical limitations and physical requirements of work and in the discretion granted the individual to do a job in the ways and at the pace consonant with capacities.
Where the fit is poor, the individual m ight be referred to a different job.
One should not interpret the results o f this article to mean that no one with the physical capacity to work malingers. Certainly some malingering exists, as any encounter with medical practice would indicate. But it is a phenomenon which cannot be predicted system atically. That being so, m alingering is a myth, one now being used to legitimate cutbacks in disability benefits.
